Reed v. State Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 43815 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
9-23-2016
Reed v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43815
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Reed v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43815" (2016). Not Reported. 3008.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/3008
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 






























BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
________________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA  
________________________ 
 





LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. O. Box 83720 






ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
Interim State Appellate 
Public Defender 
P. O. Box 2816 

















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... ii 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1 
 
 Nature Of The Case ................................................................................... 1 
 
 Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ........................ 1 
 
ISSUES ................................................................................................................. 2 
 
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 3 
 
 I. Reed Has Failed To Show That The District Court 
  Erred When It Concluded That Reed Had Failed 
  To Make A Prima Facie Case Of Either Deficient 
  Performance Or Prejudice Related To Redaction 
  Of Statements He Made In The Police Interview ............................. 3 
 
  A. Introduction ........................................................................... 3 
 
  B. Standard Of Review .............................................................. 5 
 
  C. The District Court Properly Dismissed Reed’s 
   Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
   For Not Moving To Further Redact The 
   Interview Recording .............................................................. 5 
 
 II. Reed Has Failed To Show That The District Court’s 
  Determination That A Special Unanimity Instruction 
  Was Not Required Was Error .......................................................... 9 
 
  A. Introduction ........................................................................... 9 
 
  B. Standard Of Review ............................................................ 10 
 
  C. Reed Has Failed To Show Error In The District 
   Court’s Analysis .................................................................. 10 
 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 14 
 









Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 16 P.3d 937 (Ct. App. 2000) ................................. 9 
Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 168 P.3d 40 (Ct. App. 2007) ............................... 7 
Payne v. State, 159 Idaho 879, 367 P.3d 274 (Ct. App. 2016) ......................... 5, 6 
Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 6 P.3d 831 (2000) .................................................. 7 
Severson v. State, 159 Idaho 517, 363 P.3d 358 (2015) ...................................... 5 
State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 348 P.3d 1 (2015) ............................. 5, 6, 7, 13 
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 272 P.3d 417 (2012) ...................................... 11 
State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008) ...................................... 11 
State v. Reed, 154 Idaho 120, 294 P.3d 1132 (Ct. App. 2012) ....................... 8, 12 
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P.3d 414 (2009) .................................... 11 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) .................................................... 5 
Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 266 P.3d 1169 (Ct. App. 2011) .............................. 10 
STATUTES 









STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Bruce Edward Reed appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition 
for post-conviction relief.  He challenges denial of two of his claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Reed filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his conviction for 
enticement of a child over the internet.  (R., pp. 5-8, 50-62, 104-21.)  Among the 
claims asserted were that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a 
“unanimity instruction” at trial (R., pp. 59-60) and that counsel was ineffective for 
not seeking further redaction of parts of the recording of Reed’s interview by 
police (R., pp. 109-10).   
 The state moved for summary disposition of the petition.  (R., pp. 18-26, 
127-46.)  The district court also provided a notice of intent to dismiss. 
(R., pp. 162-76.)  The district court thereafter summarily dismissed the petition.  
(R., pp. 178-92.)  The district court concluded that Reed had failed to establish 
prima facie claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking further 
redaction of statements made in the police interview (R., p. 185) and not seeking 
a special unanimity instruction (R., pp. 188-90).  
 Reed filed a notice of appeal after the district court entered its order 
summarily dismissing.  (R., pp. 194-96.)  Although not made part of the record, 






 Reed states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Reed’s 
claim that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel in failing to move to redact statements made during 
a recorded interrogation that tended to implicate Mr. Reed in 
prior misconduct? 
 
2. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Reed’s 
claim that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel in failing to request a unanimity instruction? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Reed failed to show that the district court erred when it concluded that 
Reed had failed to make a prima facie claim of either deficient performance or 
prejudice related to redaction of statements he made in the police interview? 
 
2. Has Reed failed to show error in the district court’s determination that a 
special unanimity instruction was not required, and therefore counsel was not 










Reed Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Concluded That 
Reed Had Failed To Make A Prima Facie Case Of Either Deficient Performance 





 In his petition Reed alleged as follows: 
The interview video of the Defendant, as redacted by the State, 
was prejudicial in that it left out portions of the interview that were 
relevant to explain or qualify the context in which the statements 
were made. 
 
Specifically, Mr. Reed is very concerned about how difficult 
this case will be on his family. This is because, when he was 
arrested on kidnaping charges, the entire experience was very 
difficult on his family. Accordingly, while being interviewed by police 
about this case the officer tells Mr. Reed “I agree it hurts them 
when a loved one messes up like this, but what they want is the 
best for you.” (Interview Video of Mr. Reed.) Mr. Reed then 
responds by telling the officer “I’ve been working hard and I try and 
I love everybody.” (Interview Video of Mr. Reed.) The officer says, 
“They want to see that you can change.” And Mr. Reed responds 
by saying “I have changed.” (Interview Video of Mr. Reed.) 
 
Obviously, the video played for the jury redacted the 
information about Mr. Reed’s unrelated prior case. However, the 
video played for the jury included Mr. Reed’s statements “I have 
changed.” These statements were entirely out of context. 
Accordingly, it left the jury no other choice but to put them in the 
context of the trial. Specifically, that he had once engaged in 
enticing children but now he has changed. 
 
Mr. Reed had the right to have the jury hear statements that 
ought to have been considered in fairness so as to portray the true 
context of the statements, and not the skewed view of the 
statements as depicted by the State. Trial Counsel’s performance 
was deficient for failing to request that Mr. Reed’s statement “I have 
changed” be redacted from the video and such deficient 
performance prejudiced Mr. Reed’s right to a fair trial. 
 
(R., p. 110.) 
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 The state moved to dismiss this claim.  (R., pp. 138-39.)  The state 
pointed out that trial counsel had testified that he was very concerned about 
redacting the discussion of the prior kidnapping charge, and that portion was 
redacted.  (R., p. 139.)  Trial counsel testified that the comment, “I have 
changed,” was, after the redaction, “out of context,” but that did not concern him 
because the statement itself was innocuous, and he did not believe it would 
concern the jury.  (Id.)  The state argued the claim was “bare and conclusory” 
because there was “no evidence” of how the jury interpreted “these three words” 
and no evidence that “these three words” affected the outcome of the trial.  (Id.)  
 The district court summarily dismissed this claim because the “alleged 
failure to place the words [“I have changed”] in context was a strategic and 
tactical decision which cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief.  Further, 
Reed has not alleged facts which, if true, would demonstrate a reasonable 
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had 
Mr. Roark requested that other portions of the interview be played or that the 
statement be redacted.”  (R., p. 170.) 
 On appeal Reed argues the phrase “I have changed” “tends to implicate 
Mr. Reed in prior, similar misconduct.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 12.)  Because of this 
tendency, trial counsel was deficient for failing to move to have it redacted and 
Reed was prejudiced because, had the phrase been redacted, “the outcome of 
the trial would have been different.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-14.)  Application of 
the correct legal standards to the record in this case shows that the district court 
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properly concluded that Reed had failed to present a prima facie claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same 
standards utilized by the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner’s 
admissible evidence asserts facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to 
relief.”  Payne v. State, 159 Idaho 879, ___, 367 P.3d 274, 278 (Ct. App. 2016). 
 
C. The District Court Properly Dismissed Reed’s Claim Of Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel For Not Moving To Further Redact The Interview 
Recording 
 
 “To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner 
seeking post-conviction relief must show that counsel’s performance was 
deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency.”  Severson v. 
State, 159 Idaho 517, 520, 363 P.3d 358, 361 (2015).  “To establish deficient 
performance, ‘the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness.’  To demonstrate prejudice, ‘[t]he 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’”  
State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 417–18, 348 P.3d 1, 32–33 (2015) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984)).  Not 
objecting to evidence falls within the area of tactical or strategic decisions.  See 
Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 500, 348 P.3d at 115.  “Strategic and tactical decisions 
will not be second guessed or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under a 
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claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the decision is shown to have 
resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other 
shortcomings capable of objective review.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).   
Summary judgment is proper “if it appears from the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, 
together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Payne, 
159 Idaho at ___, 367 P.3d at 277.  In doing so, “the district court is free to arrive 
at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidence.”  Id. 
In relation to the “I have changed” statement, trial counsel testified:  “‘I 
don’t think it raised any concerns with the jury. It didn’t with me. It could have 
referred to all sorts of things. I don’t know anyone who would claim they haven’t 
changed. So, I don’t—no, I wasn’t concerned with it. I still wouldn’t be.’” 
(R., p. 139 (quoting deposition of trial counsel).)  This testimony is 
uncontroverted.  The district court’s determination that the lack of an objection 
was a tactical decision not to be second-guessed was correct. 
Reed argues the district court’s conclusion that the decision to not object 
was a tactical decision “was in error” because whether trial counsel “did not see 
any problems” is “irrelevant.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 13.)  Reed claims “the 
question is whether the jury would have construed the statement negatively.”  
(Id.)  Reed cites no law for his argument that all he need demonstrate to prove 
deficient performance is that the evidence was subject to objection, or that 
different counsel might view the evidence in different ways.  To the contrary, “a 
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trial attorney’s failure to object to inadmissible evidence or other potential errors 
may be done for legitimate strategic or tactical purposes.”  Mintun v. State, 
144 Idaho 656, 662, 168 P.3d 40, 46 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Pratt v. State, 
134 Idaho 581, 584 n.1, 6 P.3d 831, 834 n.1. (2000)).  The relevant question is 
whether “the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review.”  
Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 500, 348 P.3d at 115.  Because no such objective 
shortcomings are suggested by the evidence or argued on appeal, current 
counsel’s mere disagreement with prior counsel’s assessment of the likely effect 
of the evidence on the trial is insufficient to show error by the district court. 
The district court also found a lack of prejudice because “Reed has not 
alleged facts which, if true, would demonstrate a reasonable probability that the 
result of the proceeding would have been different had Mr. Roark requested that 
other portions of the interview be played or that the statement be redacted.” 
(R,. p. 170.)  The district court properly concluded that Reed had failed to allege 
and present evidence supporting a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
Reed claims that he presented evidence of prejudice.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 13-14.)  First, he references trial counsel’s testimony that the trial judge told 
him, “I thought you had that case won.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 13 (citing 
R., p. 153).)  There is no evidence that this comment had anything to do with the 
evidence of Reed’s statement that he had changed that trial counsel allegedly 
should have moved to exclude.  Second, he points out that he testified that he 
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did not believe he was communicating with a minor and made no attempts to 
meet the person he was communicating with.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-14.)  
Again, there is no attempt to relate this to the evidence of Reed’s statements that 
he had changed.  As stated by the Idaho Court of Appeals, “there was abundant 
evidence of sexually explicit ‘instant messaging’ communication between [Reed] 
and ‘borahjenny.’”  State v. Reed, 154 Idaho 120, 122, 294 P.3d 1132, 1134 
(Ct. App. 2012).  Moreover, the applicable law did “not include, as an element, 
any acts other than use of Internet communications to ‘solicit, seduce, lure, 
persuade or entice’ one who is, or is believed to be, a minor under age sixteen 
for a sexual act.”  Id. at 123, 294 P.3d at 1135.  Reed’s argument that the jury 
interpreted the “abundant evidence of sexually explicit ‘instant messaging’” with 
an apparent minor against him only because of the “I have changed” comment is 
base speculation.  
The district court properly concluded Reed presented no evidence that 
trial counsel was deficient because he concluded that the “I have changed” 
comment in the police interview was likely not significant to the case and 
therefore did not move to exclude it from evidence.  The district court also 
properly concluded that there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the trial hung on that evidence.  Reed has failed to show any error in the district 






Reed Has Failed To Show That The District Court’s Determination That A 




 Reed claimed his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a special 
unanimity instruction.  (R., pp. 114-15.)  He alleged: “Trial Counsel failed to ask 
the district court to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree on which of 
the alleged chats constituted the alleged enticement.”  (R., p. 115.)  The district 
court dismissed this claim.  (R., pp. 173-75.)  The district court reasoned as 
follows: 
Here, the evidence presented against Reed consisted of dozens of 
internet chats over a five month span. The chats begin relatively 
innocently, with Reed stating he needed a “movie partner” and 
asking borahjenny to “come make [him] dinner.” The chats 
progressively get more sexual in nature as time goes on, with Reed 
commenting that he is “horny” and how he could “sex [her] up real 
good.” He states on several occasions that he’d like borahjenny to 
“come over.” There is not, however, any single chat which would 
alone satisfy the elements of l.C. § 18-1509A. He never directs 
borahjenny to go to a specific address at a specific time so he can 
perform sexual acts with her. Rather, as the State explained to the 
jury in closing, the chats, taken collectively, give rise to a single act 
of solicitation and, in this sense, represent a continuing course of 
conduct. In this regard, the circumstances are distinct from those in 
Miller where each incident of sexual contact could independently 
support a conviction for the crime charged. That does not exist 
here. Consequently, because Reed’s conduct constituted a single 
offense, a specific unanimity instruction was not warranted. 
 
(R., pp. 174-75 (brackets original, citing Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 16 P.3d 
937 (Ct. App. 2000)).)  The district court also concluded that, even if counsel 
could have asked for and received a “special unanimity” instruction there was no 
prejudice, in part because the jury clearly rejected Reed’s defense that he knew 
he was not chatting with a child.  (R., p. 175.) 
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 On appeal Reed argues he was entitled to the instruction “because he 
allegedly committed several acts, each of which could independently support a 
conviction for the charged offense of enticing a minor over the internet.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-17.)  Specifically, he posits that “each online 
communication that references a sexual act” is a separate crime of enticement.  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 17.)  In relation to prejudice, he argues that it is “highly 
unlikely that all jurors agreed upon the same singular act of the fourteen 
separately alleged acts upon which it could have based its verdict.”  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 18.)  His arguments fail because (1) he was not entitled to a “special 
unanimity instruction,” (2) his claim that the statute made any online reference to 
a sexual act a crime is meritless, and (3) whether the jurors in fact agreed on 
which one of 14 chats constituted the crime is irrelevant under the applicable 
legal standards.  Review of the applicable law and record shows he has failed to 
show that the district court erred. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The relevant standard of review is set forth on page 5, supra. 
 
C. Reed Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Analysis 
 
The relevant legal standards applicable to claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel and summary dismissal of post-conviction claims are set forth on 
pages 5-6, supra.  As pertaining to this claim, it is neither deficient performance 
nor prejudicial for counsel to not request an instruction that would not have been 
given.  See Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67-68, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172-73 
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(Ct. App. 2011) (where a post-conviction petitioner alleges trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a motion, “a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, 
would not have been granted by the trial court is generally determinative of both 
prongs of the Strickland test”). 
The jury was instructed that its verdict must be unanimous.  (R., p. 173.)  
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that “[a]n instruction that the jury must 
unanimously agree on the facts giving rise to the offense . . . is generally not 
required.”  State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 474, 272 P.3d 417, 446 (2012) 
(emphasis added) (quoting State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 711, 215 P.3d 
414, 431 (2009)).  The exception to this general rule is when a defendant 
commits different criminal acts, each of which constitute “separate incidents 
involving distinct unions of mens rea and actus reas.”   Id. at 475, 272 P.3d at 
447.  Thus, for example, in Severson, the Court held that the defendant, who was 
charged with murder by poisoning and/or suffocation, or both, was not entitled to 
a special unanimity instruction “[a]bsent evidence of more than one instance in 
which Severson engaged in the charged conduct.”  Severson, 147 Idaho at 712, 
215 P.3d at 432; see also State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 977, 188 P.3d 912, 
919 (2008) (defendant not entitled to a unanimity instruction because “only one 
criminal act was charged – first-degree murder – and there was no evidence 
presented of additional criminal acts”).   
The criminal act at issue was the use of the internet to “solicit, seduce, 
lure, persuade or entice by words or actions, or both, a minor child under the age 
of sixteen (16) years or a person the defendant believes to be a minor child 
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under the age of sixteen (16) years to engage in any sexual act with or against 
the child.”  I.C. § 18-1509A(1) (2009).  In this case the state’s theory was that the 
conversations in their entirety were an ongoing attempt by Reed to get a person 
he believed was a minor to engage in sexual activity with him.  (R., pp. 174-75.)  
The evidence showed the conversations started rather innocuously, but grew 
ever more sexually explicit.  (Id.)  Like grooming behavior or an ongoing 
negotiation, the entire course of the discussion was the solicitation, seduction, 
lure, persuasion or enticement to a sexual act.  Because each conversation was 
part of an ongoing prohibited act, the district court correctly concluded that Reed 
was not entitled to a special unanimity instruction, and therefore he had failed to 
present a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Reed contends that because conversations were held on different days, 
there were different unions of intent and action.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-17.)  
His contention that “each online communication that references a sexual act” is 
necessarily a separate offense (Appellant’s brief, p. 17) does not withstand 
analysis.  Because the offense is in the nature of a solicitation to engage in a 
sexual relationship, the ongoing on-line cultivation of the relationship was 
properly viewed by the state and presented to the jury as a single union of act 
and intent rather than multiple unions of different acts with different intents on 
different days.  (R., pp. 173-75.) 
Moreover, given the “abundant evidence of sexually explicit ‘instant 
messaging’ communication between [Reed] and ‘borahjenny,’” Reed, 154 Idaho 
at 122, 294 P.3d at 1134, and the rejection of Reed’s defense that he knew he 
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was not addressing an actual underage female (R., p. 175), there was no 
evidence of prejudice.  There is simply no reason to believe that if the jury were 
instructed that it had to agree that one of the conversations in which Reed 
became sexually explicit constituted the crime there was a reasonable chance 
the jury would have acquitted.   
Reed argues it is “highly unlikely that all jurors agreed upon the same 
singular act” and that it is “likely some of the jurors could have concluded” that 
some of the conversations were not enough alone to convict.  (Appellant’s brief, 
p. 18.)  The relevant standard is not, however, whether the jury in fact made the 
findings a special unanimity instruction would have required or whether the jury 
would have been unanimous every one of the sex-oriented conversations 
independently constituted the charged crime.  “The defendant must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.”  State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 
386, 417–18, 348 P.3d 1, 32–33 (2015) (citations, brackets and internal 
quotations omitted).  There is no reason to believe, much less evidence to 
demonstrate, that a jury, with the abundant evidence presented at trial and who 
had rejected the defense provided, would have acquitted Reed if presented with 
a “special unanimity” instruction. 
The district court correctly concluded that Reed had not presented a prima 
facie claim of deficient performance or prejudice.  Application of the correct 






 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
summarily dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief. 
 DATED this 23rd day of September, 2016. 
 
 
      __/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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